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Introduction 
Philosophy of law deals also with juridical ontology. This study 
concerns the metaphysical aspect of the natural juridical order, with 
natural law and with the natural rights of the human person. 
However, there is another aspect which Dario Composta
495 
calls 
"diceologia" which is a branch of ontology dealing essentially with 
the virtue of justice. 
Composta puts forward two considerations: 
Justice as "iustum" is not superior to natural law,
496 
but it 
presupposes it; 
Justice, being one of the cardinal virtues is connected to morality, 
but must be distinguished from the other virtues, namely prudence, 
fortitude and temperance, in that it renders morality, legal. 
Justice is a form of deontology that may be called diceologia. Del 
Vecchio states that: If the obligatoriness of justice, moralises the 
Law, this happens due to a process of legalisation of morality.
497 
495 Composta, Dario - Filosofia del Diritto II - I fondamenti ontologici del diritto, Pontificia 
Universita' Urbiniana, Roma 1994 Capitolo VIII "La Gustizia Nella Storia Del Pensiero" 
pp.217-224. 
4% Natural Law as intended in this thesis is a method not a code. Suffice it to say for now 
that in England the theory of natural law led to the Magna Carta, the Glorious Revolution, 
the declaration of right, and the English Enlightenment. It was the basis for the US 
revolution and the US bill of rights. 
497 Composta, op. cit. at p.218 para-phrasing Del Vecchio, La Giustizia, 3 ed. Roma 1946, 
p.46.
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The word "justice" is itself a symbol as that term is understood in 
the psychological and philosophical system of one of the most 
influential thinkers of this century, Carl G. Jung. Jung states that: 
" ... a word or an image is symbolic when it implies something more 
than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a wider 
'unconscious' aspect that is never precisely defined or fully 
explained." 498 
Is this not what is meant when lawyers say that the law is presumed 
to be always speaking about? What is just and equitable in certain 
circumstances is within the discretion of a trial judge such that our 
concept of equity, or justice is neither precisely defined nor fully 
explained. 
Law exists primarily to maintain order in society, and from this 
standpoint it appears quite conservative. When lawbreakers are 
dealt with under criminal law, the intention is to preserve and 
defend society and the way it is run more or less in a Hobbesian 
manner. Society has a working structure which depends on 
complying with the "rules". Persons who breach these rules are 
made liable to punishment in order to restore the social fabric: 
NO LEGAL SANCTION= NO LEGAL RULE 
The Contractarian Government 
Lawyers are familiar with the necessity of voluntary compliance 
with laws of general application. Without such voluntary 
compliance chaos, or a state of revolution exists. We are familiar 
with the concept of this voluntary compliance as being of a 
contractual nature, of give and take, between the citizen and the 
state, between one citizen and another. Reiman describes the 
498 Jung, Carl G. ed. Man and His Symbols , New York, Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing 
Group Inc., 1968, p. 4 
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W estem experiences as being "the history of contractarian moral 
theory from Hobbes to Rawls. "
499 
The notion of the social contract, of the necessity for voluntary 
compliance are not strictly Western ideas but are ancient and cross­
cultural. (i) Taking unfair and unlawful advantage of one's fellows, 
and (ii) of the protections that the community provides (such as the 
Constitutional guarantees) are, one might say, universally 
condemned and found to be blameworthy, two elements said to 
attach to the notion of injustice. 
It is common these days to hear criticism of procedural rights and 
privileges as being a shield for the guilty. The foregoing concerns, 
it is submitted, are of the rudiment of what it is to be human within 
the social context. They are specifically human, rather than 
specifically W estem. 
Justice should be done to those whom the institution would 
otherwise exclude. 500 Justice necessitates recognition of the 
different, but faces also the risk of incorporating or annexing 
difference in the name of a liberal consensus or some new and as 
yet indefinite universalising political doctrine.501 Critical study of 
law supposes the injustice of modem legality and yet fails to make 
categorical its conception of justice and the criteria upon which the 
bias and intolerance of law are denounced. There is a profound 
scepticism of orthodox positivist philosophy of law towards 
morality which is shared by progressive lawyers and by the critical 
legal theory. 
Their reservations probably stem historically from a rather muted 
approach to morality and justice adopted by Marx and Marxist 
theory. The majority of legal thinkers, however, concluded that 
Marx's frequent references to the unfair nature of capitalism were 
polemical and pragmatic and that he and Marxism had no true 
499 Jung, op.cit. p. 83. 
500 Williams (1991) 
501 Politics, Postmodernity And Critical Legal Studies-The Legality Of The Contingent -
Costas Douzinas, Peter Goodrich And Yifat Hachamovitch -Routeledge 1994. 
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theory of justice. Moreover, this attitude was characteristic of 
radical lawyers, who denounced justice as 'class justice', while 
their struggle was aimed at achieving 'social justice'. 
Strangely enough, progressive lawyers were both in favour and 
against justice, they were motivated by moral indignation but 
unable or uninterested in developing either a critical conception of 
justice, or else a programme for legal doctrine. On the other hand, 
a post-modern theory of justice allows otherness to survive and to 
become a theoretical space through which to criticise the campaign 
of the law's ceaseless repetitions. Justice in the post-modem era, 
however, cannot follow the protocols of a theory- it is thus, not a 
concept and does not apply a principle, value or code. 
The post-modern judge is concerned with justice as applied to id­
Dritt - he stands next to the litigant who comes before the court of 
justice502 and hears his speech or request. Justice returns to ethics 
when it recognises the embedded voice of the litigant, when it 
gives the other person in his/her concrete materiality a locus standi.
The law here is committed to the form of universality and abstract 
equality; but a just decision must also respect the requests of the 
contingent, incarnate and concrete other, it must pass through the 
ethics of alterity in order to respond to its own embeddedness in 
justice. In this unceasing conjunction, this commitment and 
detachment, this alternating current between the most general and 
calculating and the most concrete and incalculable, or between the 
legality of form and legal subjectivity, lays the ethics of a critical 
legal response to the material legal person, law's morality of the 
contingent. 
Law is general and abstract. Law must necessarily be phrased in an 
impersonal way because it is addressed to hypothetical persons 
who may or may not fit the category of behaviour for which the 
law is framed. Furthermore, the law treats all persons in the same 
way when they come under its operation. Although under certain 
circumstances differences among people are taken into account, the 
502 
Where there is a reference made to the Law intended as Dritt. 
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general character of law has the effect of treating all persons alike. 
This makes Law necessarily impersonal and abstract; and officers 
of Law must likewise think in terms of rules, not people; giving at 
times the impression that the preservation of a rule has a higher 
value than preservation of human dignity. Although a legal rule is, 
in fact, general, it nevertheless refers to concrete human beings 
whose behaviour it is designed to regulate. Whoever formulates a 
legal rule certainly has in mind the possibilities, tendencies, and 
dispositions of human beings, and he proceeds on the assumption 
that these conditions of behaviour are common to most men. It is 
hardly correct, therefore, to say that Law is abstract if this means 
that Law does not take into account the capacities of concrete 
persons. 
The legal rule, just as the moral rule, is chiefly concerned with the 
behaviour of human beings, and for this reason, the category of 
Law is not fundamentally different from the moral category. 
The conclusion one may now draw is that Law contains reasons for 
its enforcement, which go beyond the special concerns over the 
persons immediately involved. The importance of "generality" in 
law is not that it deflects law from personal concerns but rather that 
it seeks to be relevant to many persons and many times. In order to 
retain the relevance of law for a continuous period of time it is 
necessary to preserve its general character, not identifying the law 
with a particular event. 
The stipul�tion of the law against homicide does not stipulate 
anything about the instruments used or the times at which the act 
may be committed, for it (the law) must be able to control all the 
great variety of ways in which the act is committed. However, even 
here the law shows considerable flexibility, for the specific result 
of killing a person has a variety of legal consequences. The law 
takes into consideration such factors as justifiable homicide in self­
defence, excusable homicide, duress, insanity, accident, and 
mistake of fact. 
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Moreover, laws are binding in a particular place. A system of laws 
is effective and applicable in a limited geographical or cultural 
area. Only under special circumstances does a person in one state 
or nation have any legal liabilities under the laws of another state 
or nation. Laws apply for the most part only to the regular 
members of a community or to those outsiders who actually enter 
the community either physically or through such channels as trade 
and commerce. 
Legal obligations thus have a limited scope of applicability; they 
apply to a specific group of people who have a certain formal 
relation to the lawgiver. Only when a law is mutually recognised, 
as between two or more nations, does it travel beyond its original 
boundaries. The European Convention on Human Rights, is an 
example of how a regional agreement can be incorporated into 
domestic law through parliamentary legislation. It is very much to 
the point here to recall that the legal philosopher Austin would not 
accord to international law the quality or character of "law". For 
him these rules governing matters between nations were called 
"positive morality" and not law. 
Fourthly, as seen, law is concerned with external conduct. Thus 
there must be a standard of behaviour by which the law can 
measure an act - a standard on which reasonable men will agree. 
However, to get such agreement from reasonable men, they must 
be offered some evidence of external behaviour, which they can 
confidently analyse. The law is capable of making important 
distinctions between various types of behaviour, and it makes these 
distinctions chiefly based on external facts. However, the same act 
can transpire under different circumstances with correspondingly 
different legal consequences. For example, a man repairing a 
chimney throws or drops a brick down from the roof, thereby 
hitting another man and killing him. One may consider here three 
main sets of circumstances in which this might have taken place: a 
passer by climbed over a fence, was walking along the side of the 
house where there was no path and where no one was accustomed 
to walk, and was struck on the head when the brick-layer discarded 
a defective brick over the side; the brick-layer had carelessly piled 
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some bricks on the roof and one of them slid over the other side, 
striking a mailman who was approaching the side door where he 
always delivered the mail; the brick-layer recognised an old enemy 
and hurled the brick at his head. The differences between these 
three variations are obvious to a reasonable man analysing the 
specific details of the external act; there is no need to know any 
more about these acts for reasonable men to understand the 
different degrees of responsibility and culpability involved. Law, 
however accurate, cannot reach into the subtle wellsprings of 
benevolence; it cannot animate by force what by its very nature 
must be spontaneous and free. Nor can the law pursue people 
through all their waking moments, guiding and controlling them as 
they touch or intersect each others' lives in an indeterminate 
number of ways and in varying degrees of intimacy. 503 
Law then, must wait for a particular act; a single event lifted from 
an endless chain of human behaviour before its mechanism of 
control can operate. However, the event that triggers the 
mechanism of law enforcement is an external event, some mode of 
external behaviour. While the law can command the payment of 
taxes, it cannot require the additional element of cheerfulness, and 
while some aspects of marriage can be controlled by law, such as 
the registration and mode of the marriage, the community of 
acquests or the separation of property, etc .. , there is no way for the 
law to guarantee true tenderness. The efficacy of law seems to end 
at the threshold of man's internal self, and at this point, there is 
nothing to judge the human act, except perhaps morality and God. 
Upon closer inspection however, the distinction between external 
and internal behaviour is not so sharp or clear as it first appears. 
External behaviour is never unrelated to an internal act or to 
internal motivations. And we now that Man is not a dualistic 
entity, but a mono-existential entity. The same external act can, 
however, be produced by a variety of internal motivations. While 
the law is concerned chiefly with the external act and, indeed, will 
503 The gentle pliability of human existence with its constantly novel experiences, enlarging 
horizons, and delightful and tragic new turns and surprises cannot at any one moment be 
adequately anticipated nor fully captured in the form of a legal principle. 
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come into play only where there is such an act, the law nevertheless 
takes into account the factor of motivation, usually speaking of this 
element as "intent". To be sure, intent can be discovered only if 
there is some accompanying public act which is objective evidence 
of intent. The needs corroboration of the alleged facts through valid 
evidence. 
Law is nevertheless profoundly concerned at appropriate times 
with the inner life of the actor as the decisive element in 
determining the fact and degree of guilt or responsibility. The law 
reflects the internal working of the moral self in still another way. 
Even though the legal rule applies ostensibly and in most instances 
to an external act, it is of utmost importance to bear in mind that 
the emergence or creation of the legal rule in the first place is an 
internal act. 
Fifthly, law is concerned with minimum moral standards. In fact in 
most societies, the law limits itself to those requirements 
considered basic to the social order. This is particularly true in a 
society which exalts the value of human freedom. The scope of 
freedom is in inverse proportion to the scope of law, for as the 
coercive power of law is extended over human life, to that extent 
human freedom is diminished. However the freedom of individuals 
has to be in accordance and in relation to, (not to mention 
respective of) the rights and freedoms of others. As the American 
Supreme Court remarked: 
"The liberty of the individual to do as he pleases in even innocent 
matters is not absolute; it must frequently yield to the common 
good''.so4 
In a free and open society, therefore, the law is restrained and 
restricted to guaranteeing the minimal conditions for an orderly and 
peaceful community. The law provides the structure within which 
men can live with reasonable assurance that promises will be kept, 
property will be safe, and that people will not suffer intentional 
physical harm. Once these minimal guarantees are secured, the law 
504 Adkins vs Children's Hospital (1923) 261 US 525. 
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can refrain from prescribing man's conduct in more specific detail. 
The law has frequently been considered as playing the role of an 
umpire: it watches the contest only to insure that nobody is pushed 
off the track or tripped. It is not the function of the law to make 
sure that everybody wins the contest, but only that the lanes are 
kept clear. In this view, the law is limited to providing a race 
course within which various kinds of events can be performed, 
depending upon what the people find interesting and compelling. 
This is to say that the law as such is not the agency for bringing to 
fruition the full possibilities latent in human nature or its destiny. 
There may also be a deep scepticism in this view over whether 
there is any particular fate or discernible structure in human nature, 
the possibilities of which should be persuaded into reality by the 
agency of law. Even if human nature did require special modes of 
behaviour, this view asks, is it by law that this behaviour should be 
ordered? The law simply liberates Man from daily concern over 
survival so that within this secure context he can tum his attention 
and energies to those more intricate and personal relations which 
his moral and social nature urges upon him. 
In this context humans assemble to marry, do business, debate, 
study, and worship. They express ideas about goodness, justice, 
truth and about ultimate reality. Human beings communicate 
through speech, the printed word, and various forms of art. They 
form associations for the production of goods, education of 
children and adults, and for the worship of God. The way humans 
act in this broad sense cannot be fully prescribed by law because 
life in this sphere is too polymorphous. Large areas of life must be 
left untrammelled in order to preserve the possibility of free and 
creative new adaptation of human values. 
Law is brought into the area of art, literature, education and 
religion, under great peril. For the law, before it can be the guide 
for the community, must itself be informed by the highest insights 
of the community. Can the Law, however, decisively control those 
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areas of behaviour which by their very nature are still in the 
process of discovery? Can the law define what is truth or how God 
is to be worshiped? If law is brought into this arena the result may 
be catastrophic. The injustice that may accrue is incalculable, 
ranging from ethnic cleansing to concentration camps. This 
reminds us of what Pontius Pilate had asked Christ during the 
latter's trial: "what is truth?". Implicitly asking "cannot there be 
more than one truth?". This was another way of inquiring "what is 
justice?", implying perhaps that justice is multifaceted, but that the 
law is inflexible and prescribes behaviour with a certain amount of 
certitude. Even if reasonably reliable "truth" is available to a 
community, is it within the scope of the law to regulate the broad 
area we have here been describing, or is this to be reserved for the 
more subtle control of morals? The breadth of the law's concern is 
in no wise way suggested by what the nature of law is. Whether the 
law will be used narrowly or widely is not a matter of the meaning 
or nature of law but a consequence of society's decision about its 
use. 
Aristotle saw in law the instrument for habituating men to the 
morally good life; Soviet jurists saw in law the agency for the 
remaking of human nature; and in the United States the law has 
gradually absorbed many areas of behaviour which were previously 
considered the proper province of morality. The scope of law then 
changes from one era to the next, and in our era law has spread its 
control over a very wide span of human behaviour. It may be that 
the law never self-consciously or deliberately enforces an immoral 
mode of behaviour; those who fashion the law, for the most part, 
believe that the substance of the law is either required by moral 
considerations or at least by the general welfare of the community, 
which is itself a moral consideration. 
The scope of law appears to increase as a society becomes more 
sensitive to how human beings "ought" to be living or how the 
social life of men can be improved. The simple guarantee that 
promises will be kept has expanded into a broader control over 
what kinds of promises or contracts will be permissible in the first 
place. Moreover, the guarantee of the safety of property has also 
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been accompanied by a radical re-conception of what private 
property means and what rights collective society has in this 
property.505 The protection from injury has also been broadly 
reinterpreted so that today injury is no longer limited for the 
purposes of law to physical harm but now includes such forms as 
injury to reputation caused by slander and injury to personality 
caused by segregation - such as in the new consumers' tribunal 
arbitration, where moral damages can be awarded. 
Sixthly, the law is made not discovered. Early jurists were fond of 
saying the opposite - that laws are not made, they are found. But by 
this they probably simply meant that the obligatoriness of a law 
was to be found in its moral defensibility. Certainly, laws are made 
in the sense that they emerge from a formal process of enactment. 
Certain modes of behaviour are neither just nor unjust, neither good 
nor bad, (they are value-neutral) until a formal rule is made to 
regulate them. Let us take an example: some of the traffic control 
transform otherwise neutral behaviour into contraventions as soon 
as they become official. It is an offence to travel at certain speeds 
or park in certain locations only after rules declaring these as 
offences are promulgated. Without such an applicable rule these 
acts are legally indifferent. 
The positing or making of the rule is the only way law comes into 
being for these acts. Positive laws prescribe our behaviour not only 
in these areas which are morally indifferent before the law is made 
for we have already seen that the law as often enforces behaviour 
which is suggested or required by moral obligations. Even here, 
however, the law is made and has a positive character only because 
of an act of the official lawgiver, who has the authority to enact 
such law as provided by the Constitutional order of his system. 
Whether the substance of the law is morally neutral or morally 
freighted, the quality of law attaches to a rule only when it becomes 
part of an official system of rules, under the recognition of a 
Constitutional system, through an act of the political sovereign, 
505 Such as minimum wage and social security laws. 
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either through the legislative process as in Malta, or through the 
judicial process. 
Why ask such questions before concretely investigating injustice 
and unconstitutionality? Though there are many ways in which the 
word "law" can be used, we can now limit this concept to those 
rules which are the official norms of behaviour within a society and 
which are made official in some positive way by the sovereign 
authority. To say that law is a rule of behaviour commanded by the 
sovereign means no more than that until a rule has this element of 
positive enactment or recognition it may be a customary rule, a 
moral rule, a religious precept, but not law. This does not mean that 
customary, religious or moral rules do not at any particular time 
have the obligatoriness of a legal rule. 
When the common man in the street says "there ought to be a law 
against it" he is alleging that what at the moment may be only a 
moral obligation ought to be made a legal obligation. The moral 
rule and the legal rule may very well have the same substance, but 
what transforms the moral rule into a legal rule is its official 
recognition or promulgation by the political sovereign. The moral 
rule by itself is not a law. But the moral rule can be or become 
relevant to the process of law. However, one must understand that 
laws do not in every instance perceivingly have a moral basis. This 
means that, in the narrow view, the quality of law is conferred on a 
rule by the act of positive recognition or promulgation. This does 
not necessarily mean that a person has rights only if the law makes 
them or confers them upon him. 
It is one thing to say that to make a legal rule is to create a right and 
that until the legal rule is made a person has no right at all; it is 
quite another thing to say that when the legal rule is made the 
conditions for dealing with human rights in a legal way have been 
established. Generally speaking, rights have their initial form in 
morality. When we speak of fundamental rights of the individual 
we are referring to moral human rights really. In this sense the 
legal rule is only the official recognition and the technical means of 
enforcement of rights. The law does not invest a human being with 
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the qualities of worth and dignity - these other values flow and are 
intrinsic to human nature when viewed from the standpoint of 
morality. The identification of rights is never complete, either in 
the fullness of their description or in their number, for specific 
rights come to light only as conditions focus upon them. The moral 
priority of rights, however, does not alter the fact that a right 
becomes legal only after a law has been made, either by legislation 
or a judicial decision. There are times when a moral right has not 
yet been legislated but becomes relevant for the first time in the 
course of a controversy in the judicial process. The making of law 
is, therefore, not in every instance the beginning of a right, but in 
critical areas of human behaviour it is the extension and 
transformation of the moral right into law. Law in the making 
often reflects the weakness, selfishness, and predatoriness of which 
men are capable. The existentialist view recognises that there is no 
guarantee that the law will always be made in accordance with 
Man's moral insights or the requirements of his moral nature. 
Though human and political rights incorporated in most 
Constitutions guarantee such rights, there is no way to guarantee 
that loopholes in these Constitutions give way to unjust laws which 
nonetheless are not unconstitutional. However, a legal "safety­
valve" exists in most jurisdictions - that is the fact that laws are 
promulgated, and enacted, but may be repealed. 
Finally, legal obligations are not nearly so ultimate as are moral 
obligations. In spite, of the intimate relation between law and 
morality, the law is not the standard of morality, though it might be 
a standard of morality. Law and morality are bound. together 
because the function of law as an agency for controlling human 
behaviour cannot proceed without reference to moral imperatives. 
Law here is seen as a flexible tool for regulating human conduct, 
and its flexibility is the outcome of man's ever new insights into 
what is morally right. To a large extent the direction in which the 
law will lead human behaviour is suggested by the moral 
tendencies of a community. A law which seeks to enforce fair 
trials for all people clearly has a different moral quality from a law 
which prohibits members of a minority race to own property. Every 
legal system is made up, on the one hand, of laws which reflect 
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clear moral imperatives and on the other hand of laws which 
clearly cannot be morally justified. If the law were to represent our 
only standard of right, we would lose the independent perspective 
which moral insight provides from which to evaluate the law. We 
constantly speak of good laws and bad laws, and we do this from 
whatever moral position we have taken. When our moral 
judgement condemns a law as bad, we are faced with the dilemma 
of obligations contradictory to the legal rule and to the moral rule. 
There are in other words two at least dimensions on the plane of 
obligation; there is allegiance to the fundamental and inalienable 
rights of the individual, and loyalty to the democratic legal order. 
In a democratic system of law there is a double basis for legal 
obligation. The law is obeyed, for more than one reason: Firstly, 
because of its moral quality; secondly, it is obeyed because it is a 
proper and official part of the structure of law; and thirdly because 
generally there is a sanction of some kind attached to the non­
compliance of the legal rule. It may be that not a single law can 
ever arouse complete or unanimous consent about its moral· 
defensibility, yet it is generally obeyed by virtually the whole 
community. 
There is then a kind of morality, or moral obligation, which 
compels one to obey the law for the sake of the community, even 
when one does not accept the moral substance of the law. The 
members of a democratic community will to varying degrees and 
extents, always have some criticism to make of the laws. Most of 
these moral criticisms have the effect of reducing or eliminating for 
such a person the moral obligation to obey the law - he may decide 
that the law simply violates elementary distributive justice, as in 
the case of an unjustly discriminatory tax; but the fact that a law is 
morally deficient does not immediately lead to disobedience of the 
law, for there is still the second basis of obligatoriness - that the 
system of law, which encompasses the remaining rules and 
procedures, must be upheld. This is particularly important when 
one considers that an individual's criticism of the law may not be 
shared by other members of the community who also presume to be 
expressing their moral judgements. Again, even the bad law is 
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obeyed under certain circumstances, because m this way the 
structure of the legal order is preserved. 
In a democratic society there are specific remedies available for 
dealing with an unjust law which falls within the paradigm of what 
is generally held "unjust", without threatening anarchy or chaos. 
The main among these remedies are the legislative and judicial 
processes of declaring a law unconstitutional, and thus null and 
void. It is possible, therefore, to renounce one's obligation to the 
questionable morality or injustice of the law and at the same time 
to obey the law for the sake of the legal order upon which other 
important values continue to depend. 
In such a case one affirms his higher obligation to the moral rule in 
whose light the law now becomes morally deficient. The degree of 
"injustice" in the law will vary from law to law, and thus the 
intensity of one's reaction to it will also vary. The unjust law can 
either be superseded by a new law or challenged through the 
judicial process. If neither of these procedures is available because 
either the mode of power or the predominant opinion is contrary to 
a person's moral sensitivity, he then must decide whether to 
continue to obey the law out of a desire to preserve the legal order 
or whether his moral obligation overrides even this second basis of 
the law's obligatoriness. 
The life of the law involves a continuous process of protest. No 
formulation of positive laws can ever be taken as absolute or 
eternal. The basis of continuity in the law is provided by those 
accurate and fundamental insights into human nature and rights 
which history continues to affirm. Legislation and court decisions 
prevail only as they continue to fit the moral and existential 
expectations of society. Where these laws have lost their contact, 
either with the practical necessities or the moral sensitivities of the 
time, they either fall into desuetude or are altered or eliminated 
altogether. If they are neither abolished nor are they in disuse, then 
the result may be injustice. 
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There are times also when the whole structure of law, and not 
simply a specific law, is looked upon as of secondacy importance 
by some in the solution of severe social problems. The 
overwhelming sense of moral obligation concerning human 
relations overrides the more deliberate processes of law. The 
feeling that the solutions to these problems are immediately 
mandatocy and cannot wait for the inherently sluggish pace of the 
law nor take the risk of a technical diversion or obstruction has 
often led men to bypass the procedures of law by disobeying the 
law. This has resulted in civil disobedience, riot, revolt and in the 
most critical of cases in revolutions. The law, as will be seen, has 
learned to anticipate this problem and has made provisions for 
predictable protest. Contracy to the Marxist tradition, it is claimed 
that successful revolutions are social disasters. On the other hand 
contracy to the liberal-conservative tradition, it is claimed that 
reforms are not the [ only ]506 driving force of histocy either. Social 
progress is won by lost revolutions since they force the rulers to 
install reforms in order to avoid subsequent revolutions thus 
initiating the evolutionary process of breaking the foundations of 
unjust systems.507 However, although there is some postponement 
of disobedience to law through the double basis of law's 
obligatoriness and through the availability of regular procedures 
for challenging and altering the law, the time may vecy well come 
when a person feels that his obligation to law is not ultimate, that 
his moral obligations are of a higher order. 
Laws are the tangible means of expressing the practical 
reasonableness of authority and its subjects towards the common 
good of a community. 
LAW=> JUSTICE => COMMON GOOD 
506 My qualification, not Novak's 
507Nowak, Leszek Revolution is an Opaque Progress But a Progress Nonetheless in Social 
System, Rationality and Revolution, Nowak, Leszek (ed)Publisher: Rodopi, Amsterdam 
1993 
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Laws must also abide by the theory of justice as fairness while 
respecting and preserving the absolute as well as contingent rights 
of all individuals. 
The aim of law ought always to be justice. This does not mean that 
it is always going to be so; in reality positive laws are generally 
though not exclusively an attempt to enforce and achieve the 
principles of justice. According to Finnis 'there are human goods 
that can be secured only through the institutions of human law, and 
requirements of practical reasonableness that only those institutions 
can satisfy'.508 Furthermore, the aim of justice is the common good, 
which may be described as the good or well-being of the 
community as a whole, without however, neglecting the individual 
good, which in a truly 'good community' should be compatible 
with the common aims and goals. In fact we may summarise the 
argument by saying that the aim of the common good is the good of 
all individuals. 
Law as Practical Reasonableness 
In discussing his account of law in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas 
offers this definition of law: 
"Law is the reasonable ordinance or prescription which is 
promulgated, is for the common good, and comes from the one who 
has charge of the community". 509 
The source of human behaviour is reason, but also within reasoning 
there is something which is a source of everything else, with which 
law must primarily be connected. 
As Hart puts it 'law must have a minimum content of primary rules 
and sanctions in order to ensure the survival of the society or its 
508 Finnis, John - Natural Law and Natural Rights p.3 
509 ST I-II q. 90 a. 4 
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members and to give them practical reason for compliance with 
it'510 
In practical reason, which is thus concerned with behaviour, that 
source is our ultimate goal in life, and that, is happiness or bliss?511 
Therefore, according to Aquinas, law must concern itself above all 
with our orderedness to well-being that may only be achieved 
through justice. 
'The force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. In human 
affairs, a thing is said to be just because it is right, which means 
h 
. .
d' h l if 
' 51 2 t at zt zs accor mg to t e ru e o reason. 
Furthermore, since parts in their incompleteness are ordered to the 
completeness of their wholes, and each human being is a part of a 
complete self-contained community, law must properly be 
concerned with the general welfare of the community. 
Since law is primarily an ordination for the general good, 
commands to do particular deeds are laws only when ordered to 
that general good - thus all law is somehow ordered to the general 
good. However, this does not mean that the common or general 
well-being is in opposition to the personal good. 
The prescriptions of law apply the law to what it regulates. 
Moreover, orderedness to the general good, which is law's concern, 
is applicable to individual goals and so certain of its prescriptions 
concern individual acts. 
However, a problem then arises as to who may and can legislate? 
Given that law is only so properly called, when it relates primarily 
to the general good who may plan for the common good? Planning 
for the general or common good of one's own community belongs 
510 Hart, pp 189-90 
5
11 Aristotle in his definition of matters of law makes mention of happiness and the city 
community. He asserts that we call those acts just in law that promote and conserve 
"happiness" and its components in the city state, for it is the city that is the complete self­
contained community, as Aristotle says elsewhere. 
512 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1-11 q. 95 a.2. 
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either to the people as a whole (in a democracy) or to someone 
standing in for the whole people (which could be a parliament). 
Thus, legislating belongs either to the whole people, or else to 
some public, thus legitimised person[s] whose role and function it 
is to care for the whole- [a] representative [s] of the people. 
Aquinas suggests that all positive laws necessarily have four 
characteristics: 
1) The law must pertain to reason; (Practical Reasonableness)
2) It must always be directed towards the common good; (Justice)
3) Laws are only to be made by the whole community or a
delegate; (Authority)
4) The law must be promulgated.
Human Law must also be enforceable and thus have legal 
obligatoriness. 
Law thus, exists not only in the one doing the regulating, but also 
shared in the one regulated. In this way, everyone is a law unto 
himself, by sharing in the orderedness coming from the regulator. 
Laws must be enforceable- Obligation 
One must clearly distinguish between moral obligation and legal 
obligation. Moral obligations may be traced back to a more 
encompassing moral norm, for example the moral norm respecting 
the value of the human person whereas the legal obligation can be 
traced back to some democratic Constitution ( or Act in the absence 
of a written Constitution). 
It is important to keep in mind, that: 
"The equal obligation in law of each obligation-imposing law is to 
be clearly distinguished from the moral obligation to obey each 
law" 
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Enforceability partakes to the legal obligation realm. A private 
person can admonish, but if his admonitions are not heeded, then 
he has no power of enforcement to foster uprightness effectively. 
Nevertheless, law, to foster practical reasonableness and the well­
being of citizens effectively, must have this power, as Aristotle 
says. This power resides in the people or the public authorities that 
can inflict penalties, so legislation is reserved to them.513 
Moreover, just as the good of an individual is not the ultimate goal, 
but must serve the general good, so the good of a household must 
serve the good of the city, in tum the good of the city must serve 
the good of the whole nation and thus of the whole international 
community. 
Furthermore, if law is to have the binding force proper to it as law, 
it must be applied to those who are to be subject to it by some 
promulgation that brings it to their notice. Promulgation then is 
required if law is to have force. Law is an ordinance of reason, 
made for the general good, laid down by whoever has the care of 
the community, and which is promulgated. 
Laws Require Authority514 
513 On this point see Finnis (op. cit.), who discusses both authority and law (coercion) in 
quite some detail. 
514 There exist very enlightening relations between the concept of authority and that of law. 
It is perfectly appropriate to speak of the authority of the legislator, and it would be arbitrary 
to identify authority and executive power. Authority and law appear to evidence opposite 
intelligible tendencies, and this is intriguing. Also when authority serves to insure the united 
action of a community under certain circumstances which render unanimity precarious, 
authority is exercising an essential function. But after we have discounted all factors of a 
negative character, such as ignorance, short-sightedness, and selfishness, it is the 
contingency of our ways, the possibility of attaining our goal one way or the other, which 
renders unanimity precarious and causes authority to be the indispensable condition of 
steady unity in common action. Authority is perfectly at home in the management of 
contingency and in the uttering of practical conclusions. Law is more at home in the realm 
of necessity. If any law is so grounded in a necessary state of affairs as to be unqualifiedly 
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Authority is basically necessary to unite the political community 
towards the common good, while possessing the ability to solve its 
co-ordination problems. All forms of authority, and in this case 
political authority, must also respect the rights of all individuals 
according to their own practical reasonableness, and conform to the 
theory of justice as fairness. 
The expression 'authoritarian government' then, may be considered 
redundant inasmuch as every government implies authority. Yet it 
is not by meaningless chance that this expression has come into 
existence, for in contrast to those governments which 
systematically proceed by law, as far as law can go, the 
governments which want their initiative to be, as far as possible, 
free from direction and restriction by law can be called 
authoritarian with some decency. 
Accordingly, the principle of government by law is held in check 
by the inevitable and fully normal contingency of the situations that 
government has to deal with. The relevance of this principle is 
straightforward, for law admits of powerful and lasting guarantees 
against arbitrariness. Beyond the last settlement of law, Man is but 
precariously protected against the arbitrariness of his decisions. 
Government by law is a principle that must be asserted with special 
firmness and frequently recalled, precisely because it is inevitably 
restricted by opposite requirements. 
The principle of government by law - which evokes an analogous 
term, namely the Rule of Law - is subject to such precarious 
conditions that, if it were not constantly reasserted, it soon would 
be destroyed by the opposite and complementary principle - that of 
adequacy to contingent, changing, and unique circumstances. 
immutable, this is a law in the most excellent sense of the term, but only Eternal Law may 
be immutable. Let us not forget that anything man-made is relative, both in form and in 
content. 
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Law Must be Just 
This point has been delved into in the chapter concerning justice. 
Laws participate unequally in the character of law. Some are 
"morally charged" others are relatively speaking "morally neutral"; 
but the point is that there is nothing neutral in the true sense of the 
word. 
It is argued that contemporary theories of justice focus exclusively 
on nearly just societies and ignore the issues in radically unjust 
societies. As a result of this focus, these theories have four 
important shortcomings when they are viewed from the perspective 
of someone living in a radically unjust society. The first deficiency 
is that contemporary theories of justice do not provide sufficient 
guidance on the way in which injustice should be identified. The 
second deficiency of these theories is that they have a lack of 
clarity on the issue whether theories of justice are universally 
applicable to all societies. The third deficiency is the relative 
neglect of clear guidelines on an appropriate method that could be 
used for designing, constructing and justifying a theory of justice. 
The fourth deficiency of contemporary theories of justice is an 
absence of thorough evaluation of forms of political action that 
could be considered to be acceptable strategies for the 
transformation of a radically unjust society into a nearly just 
society. These shortcomings imply that these theories of justice 
cannot be applied to the problems of radically unjust societies in a 
simplistic fashion. 515 
Concluding Notes on Law 
Law ought to be a servant to the human being, and the human 
being should never be a servant to the Law. Law remains 
essentially a yardstick. It will always be a way of testing and 
515LOTTER, H P P - Deficiencies in Contemporary Theories of Justice, 
S Afr J Phil, 172-185, N 90 
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crystallizing public opinion. No doubt that Law is willy-nilly, also 
organized public opinion, but it is not just that. Law is also a set of 
basic moral substantive and procedural values, that have been 
fashioned in accordance with higher "behavioural norms". 
However, there is nothing absolutely incorrect in saying that there 
is an element of organized popular ethos in every bit of legislation 
(even in the most unpopular law, such as the VAT legislation 
locally and the racial laws in Nazi Germany) passed through 
Parliament, it is wrong to state that Law is exclusively or mainly 
that. After all public opinion is the result of the prevailing values 
in that society. Again not just that, since public opinion takes into 
account not only the higher percentages of "ays" but also of 
"nays". The whole process is a comparative analysis, a juggling 
feat in an attempt to resolve conflict, tension, dispute, 
inconsistency and other niceties of the sort. It is also true 
however, that there is much more than that; laws are also a result of 
past societal processes and cultures, of past ideals, of past 
aspirations, of past necessities, of past discrimination (sometimes 
positive and sometimes negative) and so on. Besides being also a 
product of the present equivalent of all these and more! 
Unjust laws, as will be seen, may therefore be described or defined 
diversely; perhaps in accordance with the prevalent values of one 
society or in those of another in many ways different or in conflict, 
but what appears to be common to most is that the importance of 
the human person remains paramount. The problem was that in 
some societies some were not considered persons. 
Concluding Notes on the Common Good 
The state of affairs appears to have become slightly more 
complicated in reality than in theory. The emergence of the 
phenomenon that has been termed as: neuveaux riche has changed 
the idea of low educational background equated with a low income 
(and thus poverty). This has also been experienced in Malta where 
people who traditionally come from a "working class" background 
have ascended the economic ladder and have now acquired a new 
purchasing power. They are economically wealthier. What still 
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remains uncertain is whether this new economic power has 
ameliorated their educational, cultural and artistic skills? Are they 
better persons? Do the neuveaux riche lead a more fulfilled life? 
Do they contribute more towards the common good of others and 
of humanity besides perhaps fuelling the economical engine of the 
society they live in? Does humanity and future generations gain 
anything at all from the fact that more persons gain more money 
but essentially these persons remain stuck in ignorance and 
muddled-headedness? The argument being submitted here is that 
going up the economic ladder is not always equivalent to going up 
the social ladder. This is an emerging millennium justice-related 
problem. 
A sense of injustice is also heard in Jonah who on taking passage in 
a ship that would carry him away from Nineveh, he was caught in a 
great storm and swallowed by a fish, to be regurgitated alive three 
days later on dry land: 
" .... I cried by reason of my affliction to the LORD, and he heard 
me; out of the belly of hell cried I, [ and) thou heardst my voice. "516 
A sense of injustice was also felt by Habbakuk: 
"Why dost thou show me iniquity, and cause [me] to behold 
grievance? for devastation and violence [are] before me: and there 
are [that] raise strife and contention. "
517 
He then exclaims, out of what we might at first classify as justified 
rebellion to what Habbakuk considered an injustice towards him: 
"Therefore the law is slackened, and judgment doth never go forth: 
for the wicked doth encompass the righteous; therefore wrong 
judgment proceedeth."518 
516 
Jon 2:2 
517 
Hab 1:3 
518 
Hab 1:4 
-----·· 
- - -- · 
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The sense of injustice here is interpersonal, since it is directed 
either towards God, or towards other humans. This kind of 
injustice is not attributed to misfortune. 
"It is the betrayal that one experiences when others disappoint 
expectations that they have created in him. 519 This sense of 
injustice has always been with us. We hear for example, the sense 
of injustice in the story of Job the Hebrew hero of the biblical Book 
of Job, which deals with the fundamental problem of undeserved 
suffering. Afflicted through Satan with the loss of family and 
possessions, and then with disease, the upright Job accepted all as 
the will of God. 
520 
"So Satan went forth from the presence of the LORD, and smote 
Job with sore boils from the sole of his foot to his crown."521
Dickens is not alone. The hero of Heinrich von Kleist's Michael 
Kohlhaas and Coalhouse Walker, who is at the centre of E.L. 
Doctorow's rhythm, live in remote ages and circumstances which 
make all the difference in the meaning of their otherwise identical 
experiences of political injustice.522 The first life in a society that 
is said to be generally just, and Kohlhaas is subjected to an 
exceptional outrage. Coalhouse lives in unjust, racist America at 
the tum of the century. Except for their time, place and colour, 
they are meant to be the same man. 
The argument that no one is politically innocent is, however, 
interesting. For it is framed in the language of justice and appeals 
to its principles. It is by these that it must therefore be judged. 
Retaliation, it is claimed, is just punishment of those who deserve 
519 Shklar, Judith - The Faces Of Injustice - p83 
520 Only after friends had argued with him that suffering was the result of sin, did Job, sure 
of his faithfulness, lose patience and question God's omnipotence. In the epilogue, probably 
a later addition, he is restored to his former fortunes when he submits again to the will of 
God, which, however, remains mysterious and inscrutable. Ayyub (Job) and his sufferings 
are mentioned in the Koran. 
521 Job 2:7 
522 Ibid. 
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it, and everyone without exception in an oppressive society does 
deserve it. 
If the charge of universal guilt could mean anything at all, it would 
have to refer to passive, not active, injustice. However, the crime 
that every inhabitant of an oppressive society is being charged with 
is not Ciceronian passive injustice, indeed, have paid more 
attention to the political issues presented by racism, taken active 
sides, and in general should have been better informed and more 
vocal. 
Good citizens should, indeed, have paid more attention to the 
political issues presented by racism, taken active sides, and in 
general should have been better informed and more vocal. Being a 
good citizen is not the same thing as being wise, unbiased, humane, 
or unusually independent. No such claims can or should be made 
of citizenship. Rousseau was right when he remarked that the best
citizens were xenophobic and bellicose. Passive injustice is a civic 
failing, not a sin or a crime. It refers to the demands of our 
political role in a Constitutional democracy, Shklar states that it 
does not refer ' ... to our duties as men and women in general'. 523 
The Republic of Malta - A Constitutional State 
The Republic of Malta is a Constitutional unitary state. Its history 
predates Roman times, the largest island having been used as a 
trading outpost by the Phoenicians and then settled by Carthage. It 
was conquered by Rome in 218 B.C. and remained a part of the 
Roman Empire long past dissolution of the land-based power in 
Italy. In A.D. 533, the islands shifted to the control of the Eastern 
(Byzantine) Empire in Constantinople. From 870 to 1090, Malta 
was under Arab domination; then it became a vassalage of the 
Kingdom of Sicily, itself a part of the Spanish (and later Holy 
Roman) Empire. In 1530 the Emperor Charles V ceded the islands 
to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. 
523 Shklar, J. op.cit. at p.98 
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The military/religious order ruled Malta until the islands were 
conquered by Napoleon in 1798; this was a brief conquest lasting 
only two years until the French were ejected by the inhabitants who 
eventually sought British protection. Malta was formally ceded to 
Great Britain in 1814 by the Treaty of Paris and became a British 
colony. In 1949 it became a dependency of the United Kingdom, 
and from 1964-197 4 it was an independent constitutional 
monarchy within the British Commonwealth. With the Constitution 
of 1974, Malta was transformed into an independent republic 
within the British Commonwealth. A new constitution was 
promulgated on 21 September 1984, although the form of 
government remains the same: an independent republic within the 
Commonwealth. 
The present governmental and administrative structure on Malta is 
typical of that left in place by Great Britain when granting 
independence to one of its colonies. The executive, formerly the 
governor general and now the more powerful president, shares 
authority with the prime minister and cabinet; legislation is made in 
a unicameral parliament and interpreted by an independent 
judiciary. The fundamental law is the constitution, which is subject 
to amendment in a complicated fashion. The president is the 
weakest party in the executive branch, with the prime minister and 
cabinet having real executive authority. The only exception to the 
unitary nature of the Maltese constitutional system is the limited 
self-government granted to the smaller island of Gozo in 1961. 
Legal History 
The basic, formative first period of Maltese legal development 
covers the twelve centuries from the period of Byzantine rule 
(which commenced about 533) until the Napoleonic conquest of 
1798.524 During this entire span, Roman law was established as the 
524 The 200 years of Arab rule (870-1090) left little or no impression on the Maltese legal 
system; even then, the territory was regarded as a trading and shipping outpost and Islamic 
legal traditions never took root. A strong Christian tradition, first Orthodox and then Roman 
Catholic, proved resistant to any Arab influence. 
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guiding force for the Maltese legal system. This was not the 
classical Roman law of the Empire, but rather the extensive and 
sophisticated medieval Roman law codified under Justinian in the 
Corpus Juris civilis. This tradition was continued under the Norman 
and Spanish rulers who came from Sicily and, finally, for two 
centuries under the Knights of Malta. The further major influence 
was that of Roman Catholic canon law, which was especially 
strong in the development of family and personal law. 
The modem era begins with the brief French occupation of 1798-
1800. No immediate French legislation affected Malta, but the 
Napoleonic concept of, and approach to, codification found 
reception in a society based on the civilian Romanist tradition. 
When Malta was ceded to Great Britain in 1814 by a formal treaty 
(the continuing rebellion against French domination never having 
achieved the status of successful independence) it carried with it­
into British rule-its own legal system and traditions (since Malta 
was ceded or conquered, there was no long tradition and earlier 
date on which to base the application of common law). British rule 
lasted until 1949, but Maltese law developed within a wide 
framework of continental civil law mixed with common law 
influences and institutions. The "Civil code" was adopted in 1868 
and 1872 and represents an amalgam of French legislation (the 
Code Napoleon of 1804) plus substantial borrowings from the long 
development of the Italian civil code of 1865 and was also 
combined with the inflexible and pervasive influence of Roman 
Catholic canon law.
525 
Commercial law also exhibits considerable French influence, even 
though there is no commercial code as such. The "Commercial 
code" which is Chapter 17 of the Revised edition is actually a series 
525 The populace is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic (about 98%), and canon law still plays 
a major role in domestic life. The Church's influence has been somewhat lessened since a 
1983-85 dispute over expropriation of Church property and the position of the Church in the 
Maltese educational system. A marriage law of 197 5 is something of a tum away from strict 
canon law. 
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of 1857-1858 ordinances on trade and maritime commerce based 
on the French Code de commerce of 1808. This has now been 
greatly reformed by subsequent British legislation or Maltese 
versions of English acts. Generally, English law has been more 
influential in commercial law and less so in civil law. Equally, the 
Maltese Code of organization and civil procedure (Chapter 15 of 
the Revised edition), which was enacted in 1854, is a combined 
version of the French Code de procedure civil of 1807 and local 
customary law. 526 
Legislation and the Judicial System 
Modem Maltese law is now a thoroughly intertwined admixture of 
medieval Roman law, European continental codification 
(particularly the French and Italian traditions), latterly increasingly 
influenced by English common law since 1815. 
The structure was superimposed on an English "compiled" 
codification and continues to be so controlled. Whenever the 
written or codified law is silent, recourse is permitted to custom­
essentially Roman or canon law. 
Public law ( constitutional, administrative and criminal) has 
followed English examples and models, as one would expect of a 
nation that was a British colony for nearly a century and a half. 527 
The court system, established by the English and continued under 
the Republic, consists of Inferior or Magistrates' Courts, one for 
the island of Malta and one for the islands of Gozo and Comino. 
From these courts, appeals may be taken to larger panels of the 
same magistrates and then to either the Court of Criminal Appeal in 
Malta or the superior courts, all sitting at Valletta in Malta. The 
superior courts are divided into a Civil Court (First Hall), hearing 
526 E. Busuttil, "Malta," International encyclopaedia of comparative law. Vol. I, "National
Reports," fascicle "M." Tobingen, Mohr, 1974. 
527 The legal system of Malta" by C.A. Charles. Vol. 4 (revised) Modern legal systems 
Encyclopaedia. Buffalo, N.Y., Hein [1988]. 
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appeals, and the Civil Court (Second Hall), which has jurisdiction 
over non-contentious matters. There is a separate Commercial 
Court which also serves as the Admiralty Court. There is a Court of 
Criminal Appeals for cases beyond the Civil Court. 
The judges have been for the most part Maltese and have included 
some eminent jurists. Occasionally, Chief Justices of the calibre of 
Sir Arturo Mercieca (who was later exiled) stood up to arbitrary 
and illegal British measures or enactments in the worst days of 
colonialism. Another bold judgement was that in the 1940s by Mr. 
Justice A. J. Montanaro Gauci, himself an Anglophile, on the 
illegality of deportation orders. 
The Constitutional Court was established in 1972, when the right 
of appeal to the British Privy Council was abolished. While the 
concept of precedent is not so strongly followed in Malta as in most 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, judicial decisions are controlling in 
the absence of legislation or clearly identified custom. 
Although appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister, judges and magistrates are 
independent of the Executive. A person must have practiced as an 
advocate in Malta for a period of not less than seven years to 
qualify for appointment as a magistrate, and twelve years to qualify 
for appointment as a judge. Judges and magistrates enjoy security 
of tenure and they can only be removed by the President in the 
event of proved inability to perform the functions of their office 
( whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or from any other 
cause) or proved misbehaviour upon an address by the House of 
Representatives supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds 
of all members thereof. 
The influence of Roman Law and of the Napoleonic Codes is easily 
identified in present day Maltese Law, particularly civil law. 
English Law has, since the early part of the last century, had its fair 
share of influence in criminal procedure, certain areas of criminal 
law, public law and in particular the law relating to merchant 
- 370 -
Id-Dritt 2006 - Volume XIX Dr. Alan Xuereb 
shipping. Maltese criminal law always adopted the maxim of 
English practice: guilt, not innocence, has to be proved. 
It is very much to the point here to recall that the legal philosopher 
Austin would not accord to international law the quality or 
character of "law". For him these rules governing matters between 
nations were called "positive morality" and not law. 
For example, a man repairing a chimney throws or drops a brick 
down from the roof, thereby hitting another man and killing him. 
One may consider here three main sets of circumstances in which 
this might have taken place: a passer by climbed over a fence, was 
walking. along the side of the house where there was no path and 
where no one was accustomed to walk, and was struck on the head 
when the brick-layer discarded a defective brick over the side; the 
brick-layer had carelessly piled some bricks on the roof and one of 
them slid over the other side, striking a mailman who was 
approaching the side door where he always delivered the mail; the 
brick-layer recognised an old enemy and hurled the brick at his 
head 
The differences between these three variations are obvious to a 
reasonable man analysing the specific details of the external act; 
there is no need to know any more about these acts for reasonable 
men to understand the different degrees of responsibility and 
culpability involved Unconstitutional Acts - The United States 
Under the New York State Constitution, bench trials are not 
permitted in death penalty cases and under the state's capital 
punishment statute, the death penalty may not be entered upon a 
guilty plea.528 Taken together, New York State law thus mandates 
two separate levels of penalty for the same offence, with only those 
who assert their innocence being eligible for the death penalty. 
Trial courts in two first degree murder cases held these plea 
provisions to be facially unconstitutional under United States v.
528 See, NY Constitution, art. I,§ 2; CPL 220.lO[S][e]; 220.30[3][b][vii]. 
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Jackson.
529 Subsequently, in the separate declaratory judgment 
actions, the Appellate Divisions of the Second and Fourth 
Departments declared the plea provisions constitutional. 530 
In Jackson, relied upon by both trial courts and the New York 
Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the 
death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 USC § 
1201 [a]. The federal act allowed a defendant to be sentenced to 
death only after a jury trial. The Jackson decision explained that the 
provisions at issue needlessly encouraged defendants to enter guilty 
pleas and jury waivers to avoid death sentences which 
impermissibly burdened the defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial. 
In this case, respondents argued that the New York statute is 
distinguishable from the Federal Kidnapping Act in at least three 
ways: (1) the defendant does not have unilateral control over the 
plea process because he can only plead guilty to first degree murder 
with an agreed upon sentence with the permission of both the court 
and the People,531 (2) the challenged provisions simply codify 
permissible plea bargaining which was not at issue in the federal 
act and; (3) the New York statute requires a bifurcated trial 
whereas the Federal Kidnapping Act permitted a unitary trial. 
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that respondents' 
attempts to distinguish this statute from the federal act at issue in 
Jackson fail and thus held the challenged provisions of the New 
York statute to be unconstitutional. However, because the 
constitutional provisions were severable, it declined to invalidate 
the entire statute. 
529 390 U.S. 570 (1968) See also People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140; People v. Mateo, 175 
Misc. 2d 192. 
530 Hynes v. Tomei, 237 A.D.2d 52; Relin v. Connell, AD2d, 674 NYS2d 192. 
531 See, CPL 220.10[5)[e]; 220.30[3][b][vii]; 
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The issue here was whether the New York capital punishment 
statute violates Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by imposing 
death only on those who proclaim their innocence and are, 
subsequently, granted a jury trial. 
The New York Court of Appeals in the cases Hynes v. Tomei and 
Relin v. Mateo held the new York capital Punishment Statute was 
unconstitutional. 532 Defendants should not have to make a choice 
between death and the exercise of their constitutional rights. The 
provisions endangering a defendant's constitutional rights should 
be excised and the resulting statute may remain standing. 
Alan Xuereb 
August 2006 
532 1998 N.Y. Int. 0171 (Dec. 22, 1998). 
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